Online Appendix for:

Experience of the COVID-19 Pandemic and Support for Safety-Net Expansion

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


Figure A1: Political Ideology of our Sample

Notes: This figure summarizes respondents' answer to the question "Regardless of your political registration or affiliation, where would you place yourself on the political spectrum from extremely liberal to extremely conservative?" Data are drawn from UAS survey 221, administered in January 2020.




Figure A2: Eigenvalues from PCA of COVID-19 Impact Measures

Notes: This figure presents a Scree plot of the Eigenvalues associated with all principal components estimated in the model from Table 4. Components with eigenvalues above the horizontal line satisfy the Kaiser criterion: these are the components with information value exceeding the average of the individual measures used as inputs.

	Strongt	disserve somewh	Neither	somewh	isostee ab astee Strong
I believe it is important for individuals to have private savings for use in case they lose their job.	2%	4%	16%	29%	50%
I believe it is important for individuals to purchase private health insurance.	8%	12%	31%	27%	22%
I am personally willing to pay more in taxes.	41%	16%	19%	19%	5%

Table A1: Distributions of Survey Responses

	stron	ely oppo	atest opt	es oppose	20%
Do you support or oppose	952	90°	$\dot{\varphi}_{\mathbf{e}}$	90×	SUL
Do you support or oppose short-term increases in the government deficit to support costs associated with the COVID-19 pandemic?	8%	13%	22%	36%	20%
long-term increases in the government deficit?	25%	26%	24%	17%	8%
Do you support a bigger or smaller government? 1 I support a smaller government					49%
2 I think the current government is about the right size					39%
$3 \mathrm{~I~support~a~bigger~government}$					12%

Notes: This table presents the question text and response distributions for auxilliary questions included in our survey.

	Yes
To help offset costs associated with the COVID-19 pandemic,	
I support short term increases in	
Income taxes on high income earners	52%
Income taxes on medium income earners	11%
Income taxes on low income earners	4%
Payroll taxes	6%
Corporate taxes	43%
Wealth taxes	43%
Sales taxes	11%
I don't support short-term tax increases	36%
I support long term increases in	
Income taxes on high income earners	47%
Income taxes on medium income earners	6%
Income taxes on low income earners	3%
Payroll taxes	5%
Corporate taxes	41%
Wealth taxes	39%
Sales taxes	7%
I don't support long-term tax increases	40%

Table A2: Support for Tax Expansions

Notes: This table presents the question text and response distributions for our measures of tax preferences. Responses were elicited in multiple-choice format. Conditional on not selecting the final option indicating a lack of support for any tax increase, respondents could indicate support for as many tax increases as they would like.

	\mathbf{Survey}	Completion S	tatus	
	Incomplete	Complete	Total	P-value
Gender				
Female	56.8%	56.3%	56.4%	0.806
Male	43.2%	43.7%	43.6%	
Marital status				
Single	43.9%	43.8%	43.9%	0.959
Married	56.1%	56.2%	56.1%	
Currently Working				
No	40.4%	47.3%	45.6%	0.001
Yes	59.6%	52.7%	54.4%	
US Citizen				
No	2.4%	2.4%	2.4%	0.970
Yes	97.6%	97.6%	97.6%	
Spanish/Hispanic/Latino				
No	83.6%	85.5%	85.1%	0.178
Yes	16.4%	14.5%	14.9%	
Race				
White Only	77.4%	80.0%	79.4%	0.379
Black Only	8.0%	8.2%	8.1%	
Am. Indian or Alaska Native only	1.8%	1.8%	1.8%	
Asian Only	5.4%	4.2%	4.5%	
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander Only	1.0%	0.7%	0.8%	
Mixed	6.4%	5.0%	5.3%	

Table A3: Demographics of our Sample: Part 1

Notes: This table presents demographic summary statistics for our sample. The first column presents the fraction of respondents in each demographic category among completed survey responses. The second column presents results for UAS participants who were invited to the study but did not complete it. The third column presents results for all invitees. The final column presents p-values for chi-squared tests of differences in the demographic variable by completion status, serving as a test for selection into the sample.

	\mathbf{Survey}	Completion Stat	us	
	Incomplete	Complete	Total	P-value
Education				
< 12th Grade	5.0%	5.1%	5.1%	0.702
High School Graduate	17.5%	17.2%	17.3%	
Some College	24.7%	22.7%	23.2%	
Associate Degree	11.8%	13.7%	13.2%	
Bachelor's Degree	24.0%	24.3%	24.2%	
Master's Degree +	17.0%	17.0%	17.0%	
Income				
<\$10,000	4.5%	6.4%	5.9%	0.286
\$10,000 - \$24,999	13.4%	13.2%	13.3%	
\$25,000 - \$49,999	23.0%	21.6%	22.0%	
\$50,000 - \$74,999	18.0%	19.9%	19.5%	
\$75,000 - \$99,999	14.8%	13.7%	14.0%	
100,000 +	26.2%	25.1%	25.4%	
Age				
18-29	10.8%	8.5%	9.0%	0.013
30-39	19.5%	16.4%	17.2%	
40-49	18.6%	17.3%	17.6%	
50-59	17.9%	19.8%	19.3%	
60+	33.2%	38.1%	36.9%	

Table A4: Demographics of our Sample: Part 2

Notes: This table presents demographic summary statistics for our sample. The first column presents the fraction of respondents in each demographic category among completed survey responses. The second column presents results for UAS participants who were invited to the study but did not complete it. The third column presents results for all invitees. The final column presents p-values for chi-squared tests of differences in the demographic variable by completion status, serving as a test for selection into the sample.

	Short-term e	expansion of	Long-term e	xpansion of	Bigger govt.
	Unenploy insurance	Gory Leguration	Unenployation insurance	Cort Doniel	
County-level impact	2.4***	2.1***	3.5***	2.6***	-0.0
	(0.6)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(1.0)	(0.4)
Subj. risk assessment	0.8	2.0***	2.0***	2.0***	0.5
	(0.8)	(0.7)	(0.8)	(0.7)	(0.5)
Ν	2,419	2,414	$2,\!417$	2,419	2,417

Table A5: Panel C of Table 5 With Additional Political Controls

Notes: This table presents regression results building on those in Panel C of Table 5. The models estimated in this table include additional political-preference controls as well as the political ideology and demographic controls previously included in Panel C. The new measures come from UAS survey 221, fielded in January 2020. The measures we include are indicators for the individual's party affiliation (options: Democrats, Republicans, Independents, Libertarians, Green Party, "some other party," or "not aligned with any political party.") and indicators for intended voting behavior in a variety of potential elections pitting incumbent President Trump against potential Democrat nominees (candidates: Biden, Warren, Buttigieg, Sanders, or Klobuchar). Standard errors for the estimated marginal effects, presented in parentheses, are calculated by the delta method. Standard errors for the primitive ordered logit coefficients, used as inputs for the application of the delta method, are clustered by county. *: p < 0.1, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01.

	$\ln c$	Income	Educ	Education		Ideology	
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	0.0° & 7	6.05 & S	D. A. B. C.	Des 10	Te iogin	TRIAND	Collectra
Panel A: Long-term		ion of un	expansion of unemployment insurance	nt insura			
County-level impact		3.5^{***}	3.6^{**}	4.4**	4.0^{**}	6.6^{***}	3.4^{***}
,	(1.5)	(0.8)	(1.2)	(0.7)	(1.6)	(1.9)	(1.3)
Subj. risk assessment	1.8	2.7^{**}	3.5^{***}	0.4	1.5	1.2	3.2^{***}
	(1.1)	(1.2)	(1.1)	(1.0)	(1.5)	(1.6)	(1.2)
Ν	1,019	1,460	1,109	1,370	868	643	968
Panel B: Long-term		ion of go	expansion of govtprovided	ed healthcare	ure		
County-level impact	3.0^{***}	4.4^{***}	3.0^{***}	4.1^{***}	1.5^{**}	7.2^{***}	4.8^{***}
	(0.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.1)	(0.7)	(1.8)	(1.8)
Subj. risk assessment	1.8^*	2.4^{*}	3.8^{***}	0.3	1.2	-0.6	5.0^{***}
	(1.1)	(1.3)	(1.1)	(1.4)	(1.1)	(1.5)	(1.3)
Ν	1,020	1,461	1,111	1,370	870	643	968

pansion of expansion of government-provided healthcare, using the same specification as column 4 of Panel C of Table 5. Each model is estimated imposing the sample restriction indicated in the header of the table, splitting the population based on income, education, or political ideology. Standard errors unemployment insurance, using the same specification as column 3 of Panel C of Table 5. All models in Panel B predict support for long-term for the estimated marginal effects, presented in parentheses, are calculated by the delta method. Standard errors for the primitive ordered logit coefficients, used as inputs for the application of the delta method, are clustered by county. *: p < 0.1, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01. Notes: